The Old Contemptibles

L’Armata Britannica 1914

Before describing the armata britannica as it was in 1914, it would be well to consider its development in earlier years. Until the "Kaiser’s War" the strength della armata britannica never compared con that of the Continental Armies. The reason for this is threefold. First, the traditional mission della armata britannica was home defense, e since the Navy was large, no great stress was laid on numbers in the ground forces. A second point to consider is the tradition of small expeditionary forces which were sent to the continent to maintain the balance of power over several hundred years. During these years it was found to be expedient to hire allies to do the greater share of fighting, while the fleet strangled the commerce of the beligerent trying to subdue Europe. A third factor in reducing the number of troops nel Regno Unito was the growth of Empire which spread the greater part of the part of the Army permanently over Asia, Africa e India.(1)

Compulsory service has been used only once, prior to the "Great War". L’armata regolare was therefore always a professional one. Its smallness gave it an entirely different character from that of the Continental levies. Its Regiments, which in some cases traced ancestry back to 1660, composed of long-serving soldiers; were well known to one another. In particular, Regimental History, was a strong point, about which; even the most hardened Sergeant-Major could become emotional. Every unit developed a personality, as evident in the sportsfield as well as on the campaigns. Also national characteristics gave a variety of valuable qualities to the regiments, but all were to be known to be self-reliant e stubborn. According to historians, the "efficiency e morale della armata britannica as a whole were higher than ever before.(2)

Prima delle guerre napoleoniche, specialized units of fanteria leggera, dragoni leggeri ed artiglieria a cavallo were formed, which required initiative ed intelligence on the part of the common soldier. After Waterloo, changes were slow in coming, but one sign of improvement was being made, was the abolition of all the Grenadier e fanteria leggera companies in each Regiment. This act demanded a higher state of training in all companies. But it was not until glaring deficiencies became public at the time of the Crimean War that reform became accepted. In 1871 several far reaching changes were being made. The Purchase system for commissions e promotions were abolished. Also Regiments were married to provide one Battalion at home for one abroad. In addition Army life was made more attractive, con better lodging, food, e pay, as well as a reduction in term of enlistment to 6 yrs. in the active e 6 in the reserve. As a result the Army grew younger e the older misfits were weeded out.(3)

In 1881 the Cardwell Reforms were passed into law by parlamento. The reforms continued the pairing of reggimenti which was started in 1871. New names were given the reggimenti e the separate reggimenti became the 1^o e the 2^o battaglioni of one reggimento. A 3^o battaglione di milizia, e further battaglioni in the Territorial Force were provided.

As well as these reforms helped, the Colonial Wars were indispensable in preparing the armata britannica for the conflict of 1914. As late as 1898 the Army used a hollow square(4) formation to revitalize the Army in everyday tactics in the face of modern weapons. Improvement was made in methods of attack, defense, e withdrawel. And an absolute necessity for good shooting became apparent.

As a result of the Boer War the fanteria learned to shoot e to dig; the cavalleria learned to move in small groups e to leave their horses behind in action; the artiglieria adopted shields for their guns e learned to seek shelter. The fanteria was also fitted con a new weapon: the Lee Enfield shortened model. Its bolt-action was the quickest in the world e the Germans were astonished at the speed con which their attacking fanteria were morn down at Mons. The Boer War was in addition a rehearsal in the working ed organizing together of large numbers of troops scattered over a larger scale.(5)

On 1905 Richard Burton Haldane was appointed Secretary of State for War, he immediately started work on a reorganization of the Army con the funds available. About 1905 un Stato Maggiore was set up e Divisional Organizations developed. Eventually seven divisions regolari were created e fourteen territorial divisions as well as fifteen Yeomanry brigades. By 1909 the Committee of Imperial Defense worked out in precise detail all necessary action to be taken on the outbreak of war.(6)

The manpower resources(7) in 1914 were divided into seven classes:

Serving regolari
Army Reserve regolare
Army Reserve regolare of officers
Special Reserve
Territorial Force
Territorial Force Reserve
National Reserve

In ottobre of 1913 the Home Establishment numbered 125,209 soldiers, the Indian units 77,130, other colonial troops 34,619 e the Reserve 145,000. Upon mobilization 270,000 were available nel Regno Unito. In comparison, the tedeschi had a total of about 10,000,000 men con some extent of military training.(8)

The military training of the field forces in England were hampered by too little equipaggiamento e not enough men. Whenever a Division went out for training it had to borrow men, horses ed equipaggiamento from other organizations.(9) It is somewhat ironic that the annual maneuver for the Calvary Division in 1914 were to take the form of retirement of a force before an enemy of superior strength, involving the passage of the River Severn. However, the river turned out to be the Aisne, Somme e Marne Rivers in northern Francia.(10) By 1914 the armata britannica was comparable to the other European Armies. Il "Poilu" francese carried a 1886 muzzle-loading Lebel Rifle, wore red trousers e carried a large assortment of equipaggiamento. "The fante francese presented a picture at odds con the swift charges demanded by the offensive à outrance. Yet, very e significantly ed unlike the German, he marched con fixed bayonet..."(11) In comparison, the German soldier was armed with the 1898 Mauser clip-fed, bolt-action rifle e wore a field-gray uniform.

In many respects the German soldiers were better equipped e trained than their opposite numbers. However, Hans was burdened con over confidence, ed accustomed to strict discipline, which broke down, when his officers fell caduto.(12) The Tommy britannico fell between, con his excellent Lee-Enfield, clip-fed, bolt-action rifle e Khaki uniform. "Much more individualistic in outlook than the tedeschi o francesi, he had been taught e partially understood the importance of fast, accurate rifle fire, of advance by fire e movement, ed of cover e concealment."(13)

This was the situation in the above armies in 1914. The major powers were waiting for a chance to demonstrate the efficiency of their armed might. In luglio the excuse was found e by agosto fourth, approximately ten million soldiers were on the march in a collision course. In the preceding years, la Gran Bretagna e Francia had come to an agreement to oppose German attempts to overrun Belgio. Plans had been drawn up, ed on the 3rd of agosto, mobilization britannico was ordered. The main parties began to cross the channel on the 12th e by the 17th the whole force of quattro fanteria Divisions ed one Calvary Division was landed.(14) Some argument developed about the positioning of the BEF. Kitchener believed the Germans were making their main effort in the North, e wished to keep the tiny BEF from the main onslaught. He proposed to concentrate at Amiens, but being overruled the BEF was ordered to concentrate at Maubeuge 70 miles further inland. This was accomplished just in time, on agosto 20th, thanks to efficient transport e because the belgi held up the tedeschi quattro to cinque days longer than expected.

Although Kitchener lost on the prior point, he did manage to withhold the 4th e the 6th Divisions to meet the possibility of the BEF being wiped out.(15) By this time the German 1st e 2nd Armies were pouring through Liege e fanning out into the Belgio according to plan. On the 22nd the I & II Corps britannico were moving into battle stations near Mons on the left on the 5o armata francese. The front britannico was 21 miles long. The quattro divisions britannici faced eight German ones, six of which, in fact, made their attacks against due (3rd & 5th Divisions britannici in the Mons area. The German advance was made in densely crowded lines, much to the satisfaction of the britannici.(16)

After several bloody repulses, the Germans forced the britannici back to their second positions behind the Conde-Mons Canal. During the early hours of the 24th the armata francese retreated leaving the BEF stranded. Sir John French then decided to do likewise. The retreat continued to Le Cateau con the Germans hot on their heels. The II Corps took the brunt of the fighting e some small units were captured in the confusion of the retreat. The troops were without food during the 23rd to 25th ed on various states of exhaustion. The inability of the troops to continue the retreat forced Smith-Dorrien to fight at Le Cateau. The odds were not good, only 55,000 britannici opposed 140,000 Germans. By mid-afternoon con the right e left flanks folding, Smith-Dorrien ordered a general retreat. By evening the 2nd Corps e the 4th division, which had but just arrived, began a sixteen mile retreat in the dark. That day the 4th division had lost a quarter of its combat strength e the whole force about 8,000 caduti.(17)

By the morning of the 27th, the britannici had completely broken contact, e Kluck, commanding the German 1st Army, was in considerable doubt as to which way they had retired. Meanwhile Joffre ordered the 5o armata francese to attack across the BEF’s front to relieve the pressure on the britannici. After much haggling the attack took place only to be broken off as the Germans pressed forward. With the 5th Army being caught in a converging attack by the 1st, 2nd, e 3rd Armies, Joffre authorized another withdrawel.

At this time, Kluck thought the britannici were beaten e retreating towards the channel. He therefor turned his attention to defeating the francesi. The 1st e 2nd Armies changed direction from southwest to due south. The purpose of this move was to find the flank francese e turn it east from Paris. Meanwhile Joffre was rushing troops from his right to the left e forming them into the 6th e 9th Armies. His intention was to counter-attack as soon as possible, but the progress of the Germans caused him to postpone this attack. He authorized his forces to withdraw as far south as the Seine River. The Germans followed recklessly. Kluck left an understrength Reserve Corps to guard his flank. By the 5th of settembre, Kluck realized his predicament e started to withdraw his units from the Marne. Meanwhile Joffre’s counter-offensive was planned for the 6th. Joffre hoped to envelope the Germans on both flanks. His 6o armata francese was to attack east from Paris, the britannici north from below the Marne e the 5o armata francese northwest.(19)

Had this attack succeeded, the Germans would have been stopped cold. However, General Gronau attacked the 6th Army con his 4th German Reserve Corps, threw the offensive off balance, withdrew, dug in e sent for help. This movement took the element of surprise out of the attacks e the Germans hurried to plug the holes in their line. However, Kluck’s retreat to support his flank left a gap between him e the 2nd Army. Into this gap marched the Corpo di Spedizione Britannico. Although the BEF had suffered 10% caduti, replacements were rapidly filling the ranks, equipaggiamento was being issued e the troops were ready to fight.(20)

This movement caused the Germans to fall back further e to fortify their lines. Allied attacks upon these prepared positions quickly developed into a stalemate e both sides then reached for the sea. Activity fell off somewhat due to the exhaustion of wartime reserves of ammunition, supplies ed equipaggiamento.

The late arrival of the BEF allowed it to perform a vital service at Mons e Le Cateau. This movement stopped Kluck’s envelopment of the 5o armata francese, which could have spelled disaster for the whole front. At the Marne, the BEF frustrated the German 1st Army on the armata francese e prevented further outflanking attempts against the 5o armata francese.(21)

By the 15th of novembre, barely 1 officer e 30 men in each Battalion survived from the original force. This was just sufficient to maintain the framework of the Army in the field e to train the new Army at home.(22)

"One more tribute, from sir John Fortescue, the historian della armata britannica, must be added--’With some knowledge of Military history britannico, the present writer unhesitatingly declares the work of the ’Old Comtemptibles’ to have been the grandest ever done, in every respect, by any Armata Britannica..."(23)

Max A Forsythe

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Soldatini della Prima Guerra Mondiale

– Pubblicato: 06.01.1998 – Aggiornato: 07.02.2003
© 1998-2012 by IDL Software GmbH, Darmstadt, Germania. Tutti diritti reservati.

FOOTNOTES

1 Barnes, R. Money, The British Army of 1914, (London: Seely Service & Co., 1968), p. 13.

2 Ibid ., p. 15.

3 Ibid ., p. 19.

4 Ibid ., p. 21.

5 Ibid ., pp. 22-26.

6 Ibid ., pp. 30-32.

7 Ibid ., p. 33.

8 Ibid ., p. 46; ed also in Marshall, S. L. A., The American Heritage History of prima guerra mondiale, (New York: Dell, 1966), p. 54.

9 Barnes, R. Money, The British Amry of 1914, p. 36

10 Bonham-Carter, Victor, The Strategy of Victory 1914-1918, ( New York: Holt, 1964), P. 84.

11 Asprey, Robert B., The First Battle of the Marne, (New York: Lippincot, 1962), P. 27

12 Ibid., p. 15.; for a comparison between a German Corps ed an English Division see the appendix. Information for these diagrams taken from Hoffschimdt, E.J. & Tantum, W.H., German Army & Navy Uniforms & Insignia 1871-1918, (Old Greenwhich, Conn: We Inc., 1968), p. 43; Rankin, Robert H., Helmets e Headress of the Imperial German Army 1870-1918, (Publication info unknown); e from The Avalon Hill Company, 1914 Battle Manual, (Baltimore, Avalon Hill, 1968), p. 26

13 Asprey, Robert B, The First Battle of the Marne, p. 28

14 Bonham-Carter, Victor, TheStrategy of Victory, p. 85

15 Ibid., p. 87

16 Barnes, R Money, The British Army of 1914, p 79; ed anche in Esposito, Vincent J. Editor, The West Point Atlas of American Wars, II ( New York: Praeger, 1964), opposite map 5.

17 Asprey, Robert B, The First Battle of the Marne, pp.58-71; Barnes R. Money, The British Army of 1914, p. 88-90 e ; Esposito, Vincent, The West Point Atlas, opposite map 7.

18 Esposito, Vincent, The West Point Atlas, opposite map 8.

19 Ibid., opposite maps 9 e 10

20 Ibid., opposite maps 11 e 12.

21 Barnes, R. Money, The British Army of 1914, p. 106

22 Bonham-Carter, Victor, The Strategy of Victory, p.98

23 Barnes, R Money, The British Army of 1914, p.108